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Introduction  
Unexpected events are often related to catastrophic outcomes, and in many cases, 
organizations and humans are not able to take decisions to efficiently cope with them (Tamuz 
and Lewis 2008). In the maritime industry, unexpected events are rather common and very 
costly for the owner or the shipping management company operating the vessel. Coordination 
among the different organizations involved, i.e. the crew members, the shipping management 
company and the technical service provider, is crucial in containing the negative 
consequences of these events. Knowledge integration from different sources becomes pivotal 
in developing innovative processes to cope with unexpected events. In relation to unexpected 
events, an example of innovative process is distant problem solving where the involved 
parties, through the use of technology, are able from a distance to diagnose, assist or solve the 
problem even though it might occur halfway around the world. To develop distant problem 
solving processes the involved parties need to integrate knowledge and not simply combine 
complementary knowledge. This challenge faced by organizations may hinder them from 
developing and implementing the innovative processes.    
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Decision making while coping with an unexpected event is especially difficult when the 
involved parties do not share and integrate their knowledge. Ignoring warning signs or 
acquiring unreliable data, hinders foresight. In this context, human bounds of rationality 
(Simon 1955) and awareness (Chugh and Bazerman, 2007) during an unexpected event 
further aggravate decision processes. Temporary disruptions in organizational processes are 
part of unexpected events creating more limited interruptions than catastrophic events. Such 
events are temporarily unpredictable, while their extent is also impossible to foresee. Two 
main challenges described in the literature relate to collecting and interpreting the warning 
signals as well as making decisions to cope with the event (Tamuz & Lewis 2008). These 
involve the technologies, which enable data collection and monitoring of the environment, 
and humans reporting and analysing the data as well as interpreting the signals. 
In this paper we empirically investigate the ways in which actual practices help or hinder 
knowledge integration necessary for developing distance problem solving processes in the 
maritime industry. We focus on how coordination, information acquisition, interpretation and 
use takes place among the members of the different parties when an unexpected event, in the 
form of temporary disruptions, happens. Our empirical context involves condition based-
maintenance activities and accidents in vessels with Diesel engines and the study revolves 
around the relationship between the engine’s service provider, and the crew onboard, the 
vessel ship management company and the owner of the vessel as well. 
Empirical Context 
We investigate how a Diesel engine manufacturer, responsible for service and maintenance of 
Diesel engines installed in vessels, is trying to develop and implement  innovative process of 
distant problem solving to cope with unexpected events in the form of engine failures.  
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Service engineers from the Diesel engine manufacturer must solve the problem promptly in 
collaboration with the customer’s marine engineers onboard the vessel. The service engineers 
either communicate with marine engineers by phone, or travel and board a vessel in order to 
participate directly in the problem solving. The work of the service engineers is based on 
small amount of contextual information because of the lack of day-to-day contact with the 
specific engine, and thus, each problem solving situation requires fast updating about the 
context for the engine in question (Augier et al., 2001). The service engineers report that 
phone based communication with marine engineer does not allow fast updating about the 
context for engines, and thus, in many cases they need to travel to the vessel in order to repair 
the engine e.g., in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. This is a very expensive activity both for 
the owner of the vessel, the manufacturer as well as the customer. In many cases, service 
engineers have to integrate knowledge from the involved parties in order to fix the problem 
and get the engine running and the ship sailing. As such they have a number practices aiming 
at fixing the problem as fast as possible and at the lowest possible cost. 
Timing is highly important for vessels due to scheduling of space in a port. Changes to the 
schedule, involves high costs as the rent prices increase dramatically in the short run. In an 
attempt to reduce these costs the Diesel engine manufacturer, which offers technical support 
service and maintenance services, will introduce a new technological solution, which will 
allow visual data in the form of video streaming to be transmitted from the vessel to the 
service engineers. This is expected to provide the service engineers with richer information 
about the situation onboard the vessel, and improve the collaboration between them and the 
marine engineers onboard due to increase in media richness (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  
Diesel engines are a continuous improving product, which develop due to the experience 
accumulated by R&D engineers of the Diesel engine manufacturer. A Diesel engine failure in 
a specific vessel is treated as a unique event. The engine is part of a vessel, which has 
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numerous systems that work in concert for the vessel to function. Thus, each engine co-exists 
in a unique environment, the vessel, with a number of other systems. This implies differences 
in the conditions of the engine, e.g., replacement time for spare parts, maintenance 
requirements, filtering and consumption of oil by the engine etc. A technical failure, causing 
a temporary disruption and potentially huge costs to the customer, is an unexpected event in 
terms of the temporal dimension and the extent of the interruption.  
Engine failures are slowly incubating events, and thus, observing warning signs is likely to 
have a profound impact on the decisions and actions taken while coping with such events. 
The communication technology will be used to provide richer and previously lacking 
information on the different parts of the Diesel engine, as part of maintenance tasks as well as 
provide contextualized information during an unexpected event, typically an engine failure. 
The service engineers should be better able to decide, seek, and observe warning signs as 
well as better support problem solving while coping with the engine failure and guide the 
marine engineer onboard a vessel from distance by combining the new and existing sources 
of information. 
At the same time, the people in the vessel, i.e. the marine engineers and the captain, are not 
permanent employees, nor are they owners of the vessel. Their contracts with the vessel vary 
from 2 to 12 months. The vessel is an organization with temporal membership. This makes 
the people in the vessel less concerned with the incurred costs due to an engine failure and 
the maintenance services. These institutional arrangement of temporary employee contracts 
hinders the knowledge integration from occurring since these employees are not interested in 
learning the engine or being involved in new innovative processes. 
In sum, we investigate how organizational practices enable or hinder knowledge integration 
for distant problem solving when coping with unexpected engine failure. There are some 
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special conditions surrounding these events, which have developed because of organizational 
path dependencies  and provide an interesting empirical context to investigate. First there is 
variation in the level of engine maintenance on board different vessels, and every engine has 
evolved in a unique manner due to the level of maintenance. Second, there are variations in 
technological configuration of every engine., Finally, there is temporal organizational 
membership (Daciulyte & Aranauskaite, 2012) of marine engineers in the vessel (i.e., doing 
the onboard shift for a specific period of time on one vessel and then change to another 
vessel). The underlying path dependencies may hinder to successful implementation of 
innovative process such as distance problem solving which could benefit all the involved 
parties. 
Theoretical background  
The theoretical background of this study is manly rooted in Sydow et al.’s three-stage 
model capturing path dependencies in an organizational context (2009). We use theoretical 
concepts of this model to analyse our interview data with an aim to identify operational 
rigidities which may hinder development and implementation of distant problem solving 
processes, the reinforcing mechanisms related to these operational rigidities and the 
triggering event likely to have set the process in motion.  
Moreover, we approach knowledge integration  among the different organizations by using 
insights from Sydow and Windeler (2005) underline the tensions and contradictions that 
characterizes the relationship of knowledge, trust and control among organizations. These 
concepts are crucial in coping with unexpected events.  
Another human factor concerns incentives and accountability. The more severe is the 
punishment for a human error, the lower is the incentive to report it especially in hierarchical 
relationships (Tamuz & Lewis 2008).  
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Numerous studies of decision making underline the role of individual and organizational 
learning from related past events triggering recognition primed decisions (for example Klein, 
1998) and acting based on expertise when in teams (Rosen et al 2008). 
Our study contributes to understanding of how organizational practices influence the 
development and implementation of innovative processes by enabling or hindering 
knowledge integration. The innovative processes involve coping with unexpected events 
when the involved parties do not share location and context.  
Methodology 
Our research aims at investigating how service engineers cope with unexpected events in the 
form of engine failures. Given this purpose, we adopted an interpretive approach, which 
allows us to give voice to the informants’ experiences and practices. We conducted 
qualitative interviews, which involve the headquarters of B&W Diesel, which provides the 
technical services and superintendents of ship management companies.  
More interviews with crew members and in-situ observations when failures occur will be 
conducted during the first quarter of 2015.  
The choice of B&W Diesel is based on the fact that it constitutes a typical intensity case, 
which illustrates what is typical when coping with unexpected events. In addition, engines 
from B&W Diesel are installed roughly 50% of the vessel population of the world. Hence, 
one can say that in some ways B&W Diesel is “in charge for half of the world trade”. This 
makes the case very rich in information because the technical service department gets calls 
from all over the world. 
The richest source of empirical data for investigating our research question stems from semi-
structured interviews with service engineers. Over a six-month period, we carried out 25 
interviews with superintendents (technical service engineers), managers and directors at 
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B&W Diesel’s premises in Copenhagen. We also have interviewed 5 superintendents from 
shipping management companies who are in direct communication with the crew members in 
the vessels. An interview guide was developed prior to the interviews containing open-ended 
questions about the technical assistance provided during the occurrence of unexpected events. 
Each interview lasted on average 50 minutes. The interviews were transcribed verbatim 
amounting to approximately 310 pages. In addition to the interviews, we collected company 
documents as well as emails and service technical reports (approximately 50 pages) about 
specific instances, which were brought up during the interviews.  
In order to investigate our research questions, we are employing constant comparative 
techniques (Strauss, & Corbin, 2008; Suddaby, 2006) to analyze the data in a systematic and 
iterative manner. We are in the process of organizing these first-order codes into tables that 
supported a single theme across the various data sources inspired by the in-vivo coding 
technique (Strauss, & Corbin, 2008). In the next step, we aim at developing the second-order 
themes. At this stage we have performed a first iteration where we have attempted at 
identifying the second order themes.  
We intend to collect more data, this time in form of in-situ observations when engine failures 
occur as well as more interviews with crew members.  
Preliminary findings  
The diesel engine failures are slowly incubating events that occur unexpectedly and the 
operation disruption has expensive consequences for the company involved. Some of these 
events can be prevented if appropriate maintenance of the engines happen. We investigate 
how the diesel engine manufacturer supports a customer during an unexpected event. By 
observing the actual practices of the different parties involved, we analyse how these 
practices enable or hinder knowledge integration for the development and implementation of 
distant problem solving, an innovative process that the engine manufacturer want to put in 
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place.  Despite the obvious value of appropriate engine maintenance the study reveals that 
path dependencies do not allow for the use of the official guidelines and manuals. The lack of 
a formal procedure combined with the complexity and particularities of each engine in a 
specific vessel raise the probability of a failure. The problem may aggravate into serious 
operation disruption since the information leading to the failure is not collected or monitored. 
Thus, finding the actual cause of the problem and addressing all the related consequences 
could be a labourious task that takes time. This in turn raises costs for the customer. 
The current culture of cost savings which is very prominent in the maritime industry appears 
to provide some short terms savings to the vessel management companies, but raises the 
probabilities of long term costs, since the choices made to delay or underperform 
maintenance tasks have magnifying effects to the engine as well as show spillover effects to 
other subsystems. In practical terms, saving a few hundreds Euros by not changing the oil 
filters as often as necessary may lead to a collapse in the engine that will cost thousands of 
Euros in the long run. The temporal status of the crew and the marine engineer on board may 
reinforce a mentality of time discounting (Daciulyte and Aranauskaite, 2012) since they do 
not feel responsibility for the vessel’s long-term conditions and wish to push forward 
laborious tasks.  This latter characteristic of the crew relates to how short time affects the 
behavior of humans with temporal organizational membership, who tend to focus more on the 
task at hand rather than the long-term issues. 
Another related challenge is the lack of skills and experience, which are yet required when 
handling such a complicated system and high costs are at stake. It almost seems like if the 
fleet managing companies undervalue the actual risks involved in their decisions. In this 
context it would be very difficult if not impossible to discuss about using practices of 
observing cues indicating potential problems in the engines and reporting them. The crew 
experience difficulties in understanding the basic information provided in the manuals, and 
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thus, cannot follow a scheme-based approach when it comes to coordinating interdependent 
tasks. In this study we found that the current hiring strategy of vessel management companies 
focuses on the short term costs, and does not take into consideration the required skills of the 
crew.  
In the present case additional challenges occur during an unexpected event, and depending on 
the underlining complexity of the event, the service engineers are the only ones that can 
identity a solution to the problem. Service engineers are also allocated almost randomly to 
vessels with an engine failure. When collaborating with the vessel’s superintendent and the 
marine engineer on board the vessel to solve the specific problem, they form a temporary 
organization with a very specific mission and strong time constraints. The informants 
describe a combination of improvisation methods employed and which in some case are 
supported and enabled by the use of communication technologies. For example, sending 
pictures to headquarters, enables less experienced service engineers to tap into the knowledge 
of senior colleagues who may improvise and suggest solutions, which speed up problem 
solving.  Besides, communication technologies support knowledge integration by enabling 
the creation of a broader group of people, who coordinate their efforts from dispersed 
geographical locations (e.g., manufacturer’s headquarters, service hub, vessel’s management 
company premises and on board the vessel) to swiftly solve the problem of the engine in the 
unknown environment of the vessel with a number of uncertainties.  In this context, the job of 
service engineers from engine manufacturer becomes challenging, as they lack the necessary 
contextual information to quickly identify the cause of the problem and solve it. The service 
engineers are constantly trying to adjust in the customer needs, and they develop small and 
practical solutions to facilitate the maintenance activities. Additionally, their accumulated 
experience and expertise with the engines supports them in solving the problems despite the 
lack of information. 
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Current status of the study 
We are currently in the process of interviewing more superintendents from shipping 
management companies, and observing the work processes of service engineers conducting 
maintenance tasks onboard the vessels as well as interviewing crew members from vessels. 
We will complete our data collection in April 2015, and thereafter, we will continue our 
analysis of the empirical data. Hence, we can present our more complete findings in the final 
paper for EGOS 2015, which will be available to the other participants in the colloquium.  
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